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Introduction 
On August 26, 2011 a Eurocopter (Airbus Industries) AS350 B2 aircraft crashed after 
suffering “a loss of engine power as a result of fuel exhaustion” (National Transportation Safety 
Board [NTSB], 2013).  The pilot, flight nurse, flight paramedic and patient were all killed.  Day 
Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the accident.  The purpose of 
this flight was an interfacility transfer.   
According to the NTSB Final Report (2013), after arriving at the sending facility, the 
flight nurse and flight paramedic went into the Emergency Department to prepare the patient for 
transport.  The pilot notified the company communications center by cell phone that the 
helicopter did not have as much fuel on board as previously thought, and they would have to stop 
en route to the receiving hospital to refuel.  Several options were discussed, and the pilot decided 
they would attempt to make it to an airport 58 nautical miles away.  The communications center 
asked the pilot if he was going to refuel the aircraft and return for the patient, or if they were 
going to refuel with the patient on board?  The pilot stated they would refuel with the patient on 
board en route to the receiving hospital. 
After the patient was loaded, the aircraft took off with 45 minutes of fuel on board.  
When the pilot failed to report landing at the destination airport, a ground search was initiated.  
The wreckage was discovered approximately one nautical mile from the approach end of the 
runway at the destination airport.  The Final Report found the probable cause of the crash to be: 
[T]he pilot’s failure to confirm that the helicopter had adequate fuel on board to 
complete the mission before making the first departure, his improper decision to 
continue the mission and make a second departure after he became aware of a 
critically low fuel level, and his failure to successfully enter an autorotation when 
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the engine lost power due to fuel exhaustion. Contributing to the accident were (1) 
the pilot’s distracted attention due to personal texting during safety-critical ground 
and flight operations, (2) his degraded performance due to fatigue, (3) the 
operator’s lack of a policy requiring that an operational control center specialist be 
notified of abnormal fuel situations, and (4) the lack of practice representative of 
an actual engine failure at cruise airspeed in the pilot’s autorotation training in the 
accident make and model helicopter (NTSB, 2013). 
Because of its unique flight environment, helicopter emergency medical services 
(HEMS) is among the most dangerous types of flying in commercial aviation today (Federal 
Aviation Administration [FAA], 2014).  “The pressure to safely and quickly conduct … 
operations in various environmental conditions … makes EMS operations inherently dangerous” 
(NTSB, 2006b, p. vii).  Off airport operations, low altitude flight environment, remote and/or 
challenging locations, spotty or inaccurate weather data along the route of flight, and little or no 
warning before mission dispatch are all factors which add to the complexity of HEMS flying 
(Zuccaro, 2009).  
This study was conducted to enhance understanding of the factors that contribute to 
HEMS accidents.  Building on prior research, Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (HFACS) was used to examine HEMS accidents for the years 2000-2016.  Questions 
addressed include:   
1. Which errors or preconditions occurred most often?  
2. Which errors or preconditions were most frequently associated with fatal 
accidents? 
3. During which phase of flight did most of errors take place? 
4. How do these findings compare with previous research? 
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HFACS 
Building on James Reason’s (1990) “Swiss Cheese” model of human error, the HFACS 
system provides investigators with a “comprehensive, user-friendly tool for identifying and 
classifying the human causes of aviation accidents” (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000, p. 13).  
Originally developed for the Navy and Marine Corps, HFACS is now used by all branches of the 
military when investigating human error accidents (Bilbro, 2013).  It has also been used to 
examine civilian commercial airline accidents and incidents (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001).   
HFACS divides human failure into four main categories: unsafe acts, preconditions for 
unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, and organizational influences.  Unsafe acts can be loosely 
subdivided into two groups: errors and violations.  Errors are any action that fails to achieve its 
intended outcome (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000).  Violations on the other hand, arise because of 
the “conscious failure to adhere to procedures or regulations” (Helmreich, 2000, p. 782).  The 
main difference between errors and violations is intent: violations are deliberate whereas errors 
are not.    
Within HFACS, errors are further divided according to cause.  Skill-based errors 
represent well practiced behaviors that occur without significant thought.  In aviation, these are 
referred to as the “stick and rudder” skills necessary to safely and competently fly an aircraft 
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000).  Skill-based errors occur during routine activities when attention 
is diverted from a task or there is a failure of memory.  In most cases the individual has the 
knowledge, skills, and experience to perform the action, but something causes the operator’s 
attention to stray or a checklist item is forgotten (von Thaden, Gibbons, & Suzuki, 2007).  
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Table 1 
Unsafe Acts  
Errors  Examples 
  
Skill-Based Breakdown in visual scan 
Failed to prioritize attention 
Inadvertent use of flight controls 
Omitted step in a procedure 
Omitted checklist item 
Poor technique 
Over-controlled the aircraft 
  
Decision Based Improper procedure 
Misdiagnosed emergency 
Wrong response to emergency 
Exceeded ability 
Inappropriate maneuver 
Poor decision 
  
Perceptual Errors (due to) Misjudged distance/altitude/airspeed 
Spatial disorientation 
Visual illusion 
Adapted from (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000, p. 4) 
 
Decision errors “represents intentional behavior that proceeds as intended, yet the plan 
proves inadequate or inappropriate for the situation” (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000, p. 4).  
Decisional errors result from the pilot’s failure to choose the correct procedure, adequately 
diagnose the problem, or make the appropriate choice among competing priorities.     
The third major type of error deals with perception.  Perceptual errors typically occur 
when “sensory input is degraded or ‘unusual,’ as is the case with visual illusions and spatial 
disorientation, or when aircrews misjudge the aircraft’s altitude, attitude, or airspeed” (Shappell 
& Wiegmann, 2000, p. 5).  It is important to stress it is not the illusion or disorientation that is 
classified as a perceptual error; rather, it is the pilot’s inappropriate response to the disturbance.  
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For example, instrument rated pilots routinely experience visual or vestibular disturbances while 
flying in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC).  Because of this, their training 
emphasizes relying on the instruments while ignoring their senses.  These altered sensations only 
contribute to error when the pilot fails to adhere to training and responds inappropriately, as is 
the case when the pilot flies the aircraft under control into the water or ground during a “black 
hole” approach on a dark, starless night.   
The second major cause of unsafe acts are violations.  Violations are decisional errors.  
They are the conscious failure to follow established procedure or rules.  Violations may be 
classified as either routine or exceptional (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000).  Routine violations are 
usually known by the management structure and tolerated.  They traditionally do not have a 
consequence attached and therefore become part of the company’s culture.  “Observation shows 
that if the quickest and most convenient path between two related points involves transgressing 
an apparently trivial and rarely sanctioned safety procedure, then it will be violated routinely by 
the operators of the system” (Reason, 1990, sec. 7.2).   
Exceptional violations are those that are not tolerated by management and often have 
significant consequences attached to their discovery.  They occur “when an individual is 
attempting to solve problems in unusual situations.  The individual, in attempting to solve new 
problems, violates a rule to achieve the desired goal.  These violations are commonly associated 
with high risk, often because the consequences of the action are not fully understood or because 
the violation is known to be dangerous but seems inescapable” (Health and Safety Executive, 
1995, p. 9). 
In addition to the unsafe acts of the operator, HFACS remains cognizant of how physical 
and mental limitations, as well as the occupational environment, affect human error.  HFACS 
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addresses preconditions, which allow or encourage human error to occur.  In terms of the 
operator (pilot and/or flight crew), HFACS divides preconditions into two classes: substandard 
condition of the operator and substandard practices of the operator.  Substandard condition of the 
operator include adverse mental states (complacency, get-home-itis, loss of situational 
awareness, hazardous attitudes, and misplaced motivation), adverse physical states (fatigue, 
illness, incapacitation) and physical or mental limitations such as insufficient reaction time and 
physical or mental incompatibility with the task (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000).  Substandard 
practices include Crew Resource Management (CRM) issues and personal choices such as self-
medicating and violations of bottle to throttle requirements.   
Beyond the operator, HFACS examines the supervisory and organizational decisions and 
practices that prevent or encourage error.  Unsafe or inadequate supervision as well as decisions 
from upper management all play a role in orchestrating the milieu in which errors occur.  Reason 
(1997) insists that oftentimes human error is “more a consequence than a cause” and that “errors 
are the symptoms that reveal the presence of latent conditions in the system at large” (p. 226).   
A common reaction to error is to blame the operator (Reason, 1990, 1997, 2008; Shappell 
& Wiegmann, 2000).  In this way errors are treated as a Human Resources concern; one where 
individual punishment follows any infraction.  “This punitive approach does not solve the 
problem. People function within systems designed by an organization. An individual may be at 
fault, but frequently the system is also at fault. Punishing people without changing the system 
only perpetuates the problem rather than solving it” (Boysen, 2013, p. 400).  HFACS highlights 
the role supervisors and upper management have in error genesis.   
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Table 2 
 
Unsafe Supervision  
 
Act Examples 
  
Inadequate Supervision Failed to provide guidance 
Failed to provide oversight 
Failed to provide training  
Failed to track qualifications 
Failed to track performance 
  
Planned Inappropriate 
Operations 
Failed to provide correct data 
Improper staffing 
Mission not in accordance with rules and 
regulations 
Inadequate crew rest 
  
Failed to Correct a Known 
Problem 
Failed to identify an “at risk” aviator 
Failed to initiate corrective action 
Failed to report unsafe tendencies 
  
Supervisory Violations Authorized unnecessary hazard 
Failed to enforce rules and regulations 
Authorized unqualified crew for flight 
 
Adapted from (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000, p. 10) 
 
Methods 
HEMS accident data from calendar years 2000-2016 were obtained from the NTSB’s 
Aviation Accident Database.  The search criteria included any accident that happened during the 
period in question, involved a non-experimental helicopter, occurred within the United States (no 
territories), and was on a non-scheduled Part 135 air taxi or commuter flight at the time of the 
accident.  These crashes were then culled to only include those that were engaged in HEMS at 
the time of the accident.   
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The NTSB reports two levels of investigation: factual and final.  NTSB factual reports 
detail the events of the accident.  This report is typically released within a few days of the event.  
No attempt is made to delineate the probable cause.  The final report not only recounts the 
factual events of the accident or incident, but attempts to determine, whenever possible, the 
probable cause of the event.  For this research, only accidents which were classified “final” at the 
time of writing were included.  Crashes where the NTSB was unable to find probable cause, or 
where the primary probable cause was mechanical in nature, were also excluded.  While HFACS 
is well suited for use in maintenance operations, such activity is beyond the scope of this 
research.  In the end, 44 accidents, spanning 17 years, and encompassing 107 separate causal 
factors were included for evaluation. 
Utilizing the NTSB Aviation Accident Final Report as source material, each accident’s 
causal factors (probable cause) were classified by the author using the HFACS framework.  Only 
those factors identified by the NTSB in the final report were classified.  No additional factors 
were added.  To avoid the over-representation of any one HFACS category, each error or 
violation category was only used once per accident.  For example, even though the NTSB 
statement of probable cause may have included three separate skill-based errors, only one skill-
based error was recorded.   
Results 
Out of the 44 accidents examined, 20 (45%) resulted in fatalities; 36 (80%) involved 
some type of skill-based error; 18 (41%) decisional error; 23 (52%) perceptual error; seven 
(16%) exceptional violation; and 23 (52%) supervisory errors.   
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Skill-Based Errors 
Of the 36 accidents involving skill-based errors, 20 (56%) resulted in fatalities.  Every 
fatal accident in this study involved some type of skill-based error.  Tables 3 and 4 detail the 
identified causes and phase of flight associated with skill-based errors.   
 
Table 3  
 
Causes of Skill-Based Errors 
 
Skill-Based Errors by Cause (n = 36)  
  
Failure to Maintain Control 18 (50%) 
Failure to Maintain Clearance 12 (33%) 
Equipment Operation 1 (3%) 
Failure to Follow Checklist 2 (6%) 
Inadequate Visual Lookout 1 (3%) 
Excessive Descent Rate 2 (6%) 
 
Table 4  
 
Phase of Flight Skill-Based Errors 
 
Cause by Phase of Flight Takeoff Cruise Landing 
Failure to Maintain Control 7 5 6 
Failure to Maintain Clearance 2 6 4 
Equipment Operation 0 1 0 
Failure to Follow Checklist 1 1 0 
Inadequate Visual Lookout 1 0 0 
Excessive Descent Rate 0 0 2 
 
Decision-Based Errors 
Eighteen accidents or incidents involved decision-based errors.  Causes identified by the 
NTSB are listed in Table 5: 
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Table 5  
 
Decision-Based Errors 
 
Decision-Based Errors by Cause (n = 18)  
  
Aeronautical Decision Making (failure to 
go around, decision to maneuver in an 
environment conducive to loss of tail rotor 
effectiveness, fuel exhaustion, disregard 
for engine oil warning light, etc.) 
10 (56%) 
VFR to IMC 6 (34%) 
Inadequate Preflight Planning 1 (6%) 
Selection of Unsuitable Landing Site 1 (6%) 
 
Of special note: the decision to continue flight into IMC (VFR to IMC) resulted in 
fatalities in 83% of the accidents examined in this study.   
Perception Errors 
Faulty perception was cited as a probable cause in 23 (52%) of the accidents and 
incidents included in this study.  Causal factors for these crashes are outlined in Table 6.   
Table 6  
 
Perceptual Errors 
 
Perceptual Errors by Cause (n = 23)  
  
Instrument Meteorological Conditions 7 (30%) 
Night 7 (30%) 
See and Avoid 6 (26%) 
Spatial Disorientation 2 (9%) 
Brownout 1 (4%) 
 
Supervisory Preconditions and Errors 
Supervisory preconditions and errors were listed as a probable cause in 23 of the 44 
accidents examined during this study.  Issues identified by the NTSB are included in Table 7. 
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Table 7  
 
Supervisory Errors 
 
Supervisory Preconditions and Errors by 
Cause (n = 23) 
 
  
Inadequate Operational Supervision (Lack 
of Emergency Operations Center or 
inadequate information from dispatch) 
13 (57%) 
Inadequate Training 3 (13%) 
Failure to Address a Known Problem 2 (9%) 
Inadequate Supervision of Maintenance 
Services 
2 (9%) 
Inadequate Policies and Procedures 2 (9%) 
Not Providing Proper Equipment (Terrain 
Collision Avoidance Systems) 
1 (4%) 
 
 
Discussion 
HEMS’ flying is dangerous.  Its unique flight profile separates it from other Part 135 
operations.  However, these conditions alone do not adequately explain the seemingly intractable 
number of HEMS accidents.  This research evaluated 44 HEMS accidents using the HFACS 
framework to try and better understand these accidents. 
Skill-Based Errors 
Failure to maintain control of the aircraft was the most common skill-based error found in 
the present study, followed by failure to maintain clearance—a euphemism for inadvertently 
hitting an object during flight.  Occurrences of skill-based error happened most often during 
takeoff and landing, when becoming distracted, or forgetting a checklist item are the most 
dangerous.   
 Flights involving failure to maintain control were, invariably, the result of an untoward 
event which caused the pilot to lose control of the aircraft.  Loss of tail rotor effectiveness was 
cited in three reports (NTSB, 2005, 2007b, 2014) and inadequate preflight planning was listed as 
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a causal factor in four of the skill-based accidents (NTSB, 2000a, 2004a, 2008a, 2008b).  In one 
case (NTSB, 2012b), the pilot lost control of the aircraft while attempting to engage the autopilot 
while transitioning from VFR to an IFR flight profile.  In another, the NTSB lists the probable 
cause as “The pilot's failure to maintain control of the helicopter as a result of his continued 
flight into known adverse weather conditions. Factors were the dark night light condition, fog, 
low ceiling, and the pilot's lack of total instrument flight time” (NTSB, 2000b).  
It is important to note that a frequent concomitant causal factor was perceptual errors.  
These errors most commonly involved some degree of spatial disorientation, or the failure to 
perceive and arrest an unsafe descent rate.  One accident outside of El Paso, Texas in 2010 
involved a pilot on his second flight with that company, and it was the pilot’s first flight 
uninstructed using Night Vision Goggles (NVG).  The accident occurred on a dark, moonless 
night with very little cultural lighting.  The NTSB attributed the accident to the pilot’s failure to 
recognize the aircraft’s sink rate or bank angle prior to impact.  All three occupants perished.  In 
addition to these findings, the NTSB faulted the company for inadequate training and supervision 
(NTSB, 2011). 
Decision-Based Errors 
One perplexing finding is the large number of decisional errors found in the present 
research.  In order to fly HEMS, the minimum requirement is a Commercial Pilot Certificate and 
approximately 1,500-2,000 flight hours on average (Commission on Accreditation of Medical 
Transport Systems [CAMTS], 2015).  The HEMS flight environment is also highly regulated and 
ritualized, with numerous regulatory safeguards put in place over the preceding 20 years in an 
attempt to improve the accident rate (Public Hearing Helicopter Emergency Medical Services, 
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2009).  Despite these efforts, decision-based errors were present in 41% of HEMS accidents in 
this study.      
The most common decision-based errors were associated with faulty Aeronautical 
Decision Making (ADM), followed by continued flight into Instrument Meteorological 
Conditions (IMC).  Issues identified as faulty ADM by the NTSB included the failure to initiate 
a go around, the decision to maneuver in an environment conducive to loss of tail rotor 
effectiveness, fuel exhaustion, and disregarding engine warning lights.  Previous research 
identified the major causes of HEMS accidents as “flying at night, inadvertent flight into IMC, 
and CFIT” (Public Hearing Helicopter Emergency Medical Services, 2009, p. 23).   
Decision-based errors continue to be a perennial and intractable problem; that begs an easy 
answer.  What is certain is that these errors are deadly.  In this study, out of the 18 accidents with a 
decision-error component, 12 (66%) resulted in fatalities, including five out of the six accidents that 
involved inadvertent flight into IMC. 
Perception-Based Errors 
Errors of perception were present in 52% of the accidents in this study.  These errors are 
not the result of altered perception per se, but the faulty decision-making process that is the result 
of unreliable sensations.  IMC and night were the two most common cited causes of perceptual 
errors in this study.  This is consistent with the previous NTSB research cited above (Public 
Hearing Helicopter Emergency Medical Services, 2009).  Failure to see and avoid collision were 
identified as a causal factor in one-quarter (six out of 23) of the accidents reviewed in this study. 
Included in this category is one instance of mid-air collision. This accident was counted 
as two separate accidents, since this is how it was recorded in the NTSB database.  In each case, 
the findings were identical: both helicopter pilots’ failure to see and avoid the other helicopter on 
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approach to the helipad.  Contributing factors were both pilots’ failure to follow normal arrival 
and communication procedures (NTSB, 2008c, 2008d).   
Supervisory Preconditions and Errors 
Organizational and supervisory influences are often overlooked when examining 
accidents.  A common reaction is to simply stop looking for causes after an initial, plausible 
explanation is found.  This lack of rigor is not helpful and allows dangerous preconditions to 
persist.  In this study, supervisory preconditions or errors were identified in 52% (23/44) of the 
accidents.  The most common precondition cited as a probable cause was lack of operational 
supervision; specifically, the lack of an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and/or inadequate 
information from dispatchers.   
This point is illustrated by the example at the introduction to this study (NTSB, 2013).  
Even though the pilot was in constant and continued communication with dispatch, no 
supervisory input was given regarding the advisability of taking off with a patient on board and 
inadequate fuel reserves.  Had an EOC been in place to advise or prevent the pilot from flying 
until the aircraft was fueled, this accident may not have occurred.   
Similarly, in 2004 a pilot flew into a stand of trees during night operations with fog, 
killing everyone on board.  Unbeknownst to the air medical flight crew, “three other EMS 
helicopter operators had turned down the mission, including one who had attempted it but had to 
return because of fog conditions.”  The NTSB documented that “the accident pilot was not 
informed that other pilots had declined the mission because of fog.”  In its final report, the NTSB 
faulted the operator for “inadequate weather and dispatch information relayed to the pilot” 
(NTSB, 2004a).  
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In this study, inadequate training and failure to address known problems were 
documented by the NTSB as contributing factors in five accidents (NTSB, 2002, 2006a, 2010, 
2011, 2012a).  This number is likely very low.  As detailed previously, there were three skill-
based error accidents attributed to loss of tail rotor effectiveness (NTSB, 2005, 2007b, 2014).  
Was there a training component to these accidents?  The NTSB did not list training as a probable 
cause, so they were not recorded as such in this study.  That said, by definition, skill-based errors 
are those that are due in part to lack of “stick and rudder” flying skills.  These problems are 
addressed with additional training.  Likewise, accidents which had factors such as the selection 
of an unsuitable landing site (NTSB, 2001), failure to maintain rotor RPM during aborted takeoff 
(NTSB, 2004b), or the failure to execute a go around (NTSB, 2007a) are all problems that beg 
the question of training. 
Conclusion 
HEMS is among the most dangerous types of flying in commercial aviation today (FAA, 
2010).  Its distinctive flight profile makes it unique among FAR Part 135 operations.  This 
research used the HFACS framework to analyze HEMS accidents from 2000-2016.  In this 
study, skill-based errors accounted for the majority of HEMS accidents.  This is consistent with 
previous research conducted by the NTSB.  Of particular note was the frequency of supervisory 
preconditions and errors documented.  This area is often overlooked or minimized during 
accident investigations.  The data gathered during this study clearly shows the impact of 
organizational decisions on safety. 
The HFACS framework is an accepted methodology classifying causal factors.  This 
research adds to the body of knowledge regarding HEMS accidents and provides a starting point 
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for further research, specifically trending the data in an attempt to determine if the numerous 
safety measures adopted by the industry are having the desired effect.   
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